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WERE THE 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES
OLD NEWS?
Alan J. Meese* & Sarah L. Stafforr
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of the 1982 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines on the stock market prices of publicly traded firms in the United
States. We argue that those Guidelines were perceived by the market as a real
change in enforcement policy that would result in substantial deregulation of
mergers throughout the economy. We conduct an event study of S&P 500 firms
to test this hypothesis and find evidence of a significant positive effect on the
stock prices of firms in moderately concentrated industries subject to antitrust
regulation, the firms for which the 1982 Guidelines articulate a substantially
less intrusive enforcement policy. However, the announcement does not have
any significant effect on firms in less concentrated industries or those that are
highly concentrated. These results are robust to a number of different sensitivity
analyses and thus we conclude that market actors believed the 1982 Guidelines
contained new information.

JEL: K21; L41; L44
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clayton Antitrust Act, enacted in 1914, bans mergers that may "substantially lessen competition" and empowers the Department of Justice
(Department) to challenge those transactions it believes would violate this
standard. The Department's policy governing whether to challenge proposed
mergers, that is, its merger enforcement policy, is an important part of the U.
S.'s overall antitrust regime. This policy not only affects which mergers will
be allowed, it also affects the costs of merging because, even if unsuccessful,
any challenge will impose significant costs on merging parties. Ultimately,
the Department's merger enforcement policy serves as a form of regulation
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with the result that changes to that policy can affect the profitability of firms
subject to the Clayton Act.
Not surprisingly, firms and the lawyers who represent them are keenly
interested in the Department's merger enforcement policy. The Department
can communicate enforcement policy to market actors in various ways.
Official speeches, decisions to bring or drop litigation, congressional testimony and positions taken in amicus briefs all send signals (sometimes conflicting or unclear) about the content of the Department's enforcement
policy. In 1968, the Department developed another communication tool, the
so-called Merger Guidelines. Although not legally binding on the Department
or private parties, the 1968 Merger Guidelines articulated a fully-specified
methodology for analyzing mergers under the Clayton Act, which governs
nearly all significant mergers in the American economy. They thus provided
important regulatory guidance to lawyers and the business community by
articulating the standards the Department would apply when deciding
whether to challenge a proposed transaction.
By modern standards, the 1968 Guidelines were very intrusive, condemning horizontal mergers between firms with modest shares of unconcentrated
markets. Although developments in judicial doctrine and economic theory
soon undermined the legal and economic premises driving such extensive
regulation, the 1968 Guidelines remained on the books as official Department
policy through the late 1970s and beyond, even as the Department reportedly
softened its actual enforcement posture. Finally, in 1982, the Reagan Justice
Department released a set of revised Merger Guidelines that better aligned
the Department's enforcement policy with case law and the teachings of economic theory. Like the 1968 Guidelines they replaced, the 1982 Guidelines
articulated a comprehensive methodology for assessing proposed mergers,
thereby informing market actors what types of transactions the Department
would and would not challenge in the future.
On their face, the 1982 Guidelines were significantly less intrusive than the
1968 Guidelines and thus appeared to constitute significant deregulation. For
instance, the new guidelines raised the concentration thresholds necessary to
trigger a challenge, thereby creating de facto safe harbors for numerous transactions the 1968 Guidelines would have condemned outright. Moreover, and
unlike the 1968 Guidelines, the new Guidelines required the Department to
consider various factors in addition to concentration, such as ease of entry,
before challenging a transaction. Thus, the new Guidelines signaled that the
Department would decline to challenge some transactions that exceeded the
Guidelines' new and higher concentration thresholds.
Like their predecessors, the 1982 Guidelines were a nonbinding statement
of "present enforcement policy." Moreover, most commentators agree that
enforcement policy had evolved significantly in a less interventionist direction
even before the 1982 announcement. Indeed, well before the 1982 announcement, the principal author of the 1982 Guidelines, Assistant Attorney General
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William Baxter, had expressly declared that the 1968 Guidelines were no
longer accurate reflections of the Department's enforcement policy. The
Department had even gone so far as to dismiss a merger challenge brought by
the Carter Administration because the resulting market shares and concentration, although higher than the thresholds requiring a challenge under the
1968 Guidelines, did not warrant an inference of post-merger anticompetitive
effects.1 These developments provided a form of regulatory guidance to market actors who presumably adjusted their conduct, including the propensity to
merge and identity of merger partners, accordingly.
Did the new 1982 Guidelines have any meaningful effect? Our review of
the literature suggests two quite different answers to this question, each implying or invoking a different understanding of the nature of enforcement policy
change. Each answer also has markedly different implications for our understanding of the effectiveness of enforcement Guidelines as a regulatory tool.
One account contends that merger enforcement policy evolved continuously
between 1968 and mid-1982, as officials incrementally, repeatedly, and publically revised their enforcement posture toward horizontal mergers in response
to case law developments, evolution in economic theory, and experience
gained from investigations. As a result, the 1982 Guidelines would have signaled no material change in actual enforcement policy but instead simply
enshrined changes in enforcement policy that had already occurred earlier.
Under this view, the 1982 Guidelines were a restatement, as it were, of what
potentially affected parties presumably already knew about the Department's
enforcement policy and should have had no effect on the market.
The other account argues that enforcement policy can sometimes change
abruptly and in ways not entirely anticipated. For example, two scholars
assert that "firms find it difficult to anticipate such changes in merger policy,
as they represent politically-driven exogenous shocks to merger policy." 2
Proponents of this view assert that the 1982 Guidelines represented a real
change in merger enforcement and had a substantial effect on market actors.
In fact, many have attributed part of the 1980s merger wave to the relaxed
enforcement policy memorialized in the 1982 Guidelines. 3 According to this
account, the new 1982 Guidelines functioned as an economy-wide deregulatory shock, not anticipated by market actors, that removed perceived barriers
to mergers in various industries and thus had a real effect on the market.
Did the 1982 Guidelines simply describe a regulatory regime already in
place, thereby reiterating what the Department had already signaled to the

1

See U.S. Drops Trust Suits Against Mack, Two Others, NEW YORI TIMES, July 9, 1981, at Dl.
2 Joseph A. Clougherty & Jo Seldeslachts, The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments,
29 J. L., EcoN. & ORG. 1114, 1131 (2013).
See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS, 211-12, 221-22, 226
(1991); Linda Brewster Stearns & Kenneth D. Allan, Economic Behavior in Institutional
Environments: The Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s, 61 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 699, 703-6
(1996).
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market via speeches, testimony, briefs and enforcement actions? Or, instead,
did they convey new and important information to market actors and signal
economy-wide relaxation of antimerger enforcement and thus significant
deregulation? This article seeks to answer those questions by examining the
behavior of those individuals with the most robust incentives to ascertain the
impact of the 1982 announcement, namely, investors in firms potentially
affected by the change. To determine investors' reactions, we employ the
event study methodology developed by financial economists. Such studies
harness the informational efficiencies of securities markets to measure the
impact, if any, of unanticipated regulatory change on the value of firms
whose securities are traded in public markets. As we argue later in this paper,
the announcement of the 1982 Guidelines is well-suited to this method.
If, as some have suggested, the 1982 Guidelines simply reiterated positions the Department had already taken, one would expect little or no reaction from investors to the 1982 announcement. If, on the other hand, the
new Guidelines signaled unanticipated change in merger enforcement policy,
we would expect securities prices of affected firms to react accordingly. Our
analysis finds that the 1982 announcement in fact had a positive impact on
the share prices of firms likely affected by such change, namely, firms in
moderately concentrated industries not exempt from the Clayton Act. This
group corresponds roughly to the group of firms with respect to which the
new Guidelines announced a less intrusive enforcement policy. Investors in
those firms apparently believed that the 1982 Guidelines signaled a more
relaxed enforcement policy going forward than had previous statements, testimony and litigation positions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section II provides
background on the evolution of merger enforcement policy from the 1950s
through the development of the 1982 Guidelines. Section III identifies alternate hypotheses about the impact of the 1982 Guidelines. Section IV
describes the method we propose to test these hypotheses and reports the
results of our analysis. Section V interprets our results and describes some
additional robustness tests that we conduct. Section VI concludes.

II. BACKGROUND ON MERGER ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Merger enforcement policy evolves over time in response to changes in economic theory and case law. Market actors presumably monitor such evolution and adjust their propensity to merge and the identity of merger partners
accordingly. This section details this evolution in enforcement policy, including the policy contained in the 1968 Merger Guidelines and pursued in the
1970s, subsequent changes in the case law and economic theory, indications
by the Department that the 1968 Guidelines were no long accurate statements of enforcement policy, and the significantly relaxed enforcement policy contained in the 1982 Merger Guidelines.
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A. Post-1950 Merger Enforcement Policy and the 1968 Guidelines
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Department challenged numerous transactions in markets that would appear quite competitive today. In United States
v. Von's Grocery, 4 for instance, the Department attacked, and the Supreme
Court condemned, a merger creating a firm with a 7.5 percent share of a
market with over 3,700 firms and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
below 500, even though 173 firms had entered the market in the preceding
decade. 5 The Department claimed that the merger epitomized a trend
toward oligopoly, although the Court concluded that it exemplified a trend
toward fewer independent firms in the relevant market, ignoring any potential efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. 6
Although decisions such as Von's granted the Department wide discretion
to initiate successful merger challenges, the Department nonetheless issued
guidelines in 1968 purporting to constrain that discretion.' Authored by
Donald Turner, the first economist to head the Department's Antitrust
Division (Division), those Guidelines were a straightforward application of
industrial organization's "structure-conduct-performance" (SCP) paradigm. 8 The 1968 Guidelines required challenges of mergers between firms
with shares of four percent or more in markets with four-firm concentration
ratios of at least 75 percent. In less concentrated markets, those thresholds
were raised slightly, as the Department would only challenge transactions
between firms with five percent or more of such markets. The 1968
Guidelines announced even stricter standards for certain subcategories of
transactions, including those involving "disruptive" firms, those in markets
displaying a "trend toward concentration," and those where an "insubstantial" firm possessed "an unusual competitive advantage." Although mergers
that increased entry barriers were also more suspect, the Guidelines ignored
precedents such as Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, which suggested
that courts consider ease of entry when evaluating a merger.9 The Guidelines
also relegated consideration of efficiencies to unexplained "exceptional circumstances," claiming that firms could realize any economies via internal
expansion and that measurement of efficiencies is extremely difficult.
4 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
The HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares for each firm in an industry. Markets
with HHIs below 1000 are generally considered unconcentrated.
6 See Richard A. Posner, ANTITRUST LAw: AN EcoNoMIC PERSPECTIVE 106 (1976); Milton
Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking, 76 YALE L. J. 92, 102-4 (1966).
7 See Thomas B. Leary, The EssentialStability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST

L. J. 105, 108-9 (2002).
See Joe S. Bain, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1968) and Donald F. Turner, The Merits
of Anti-Merger Policy--A Reply to Professor Galbraith, 19 CASE WES. L. REV. 201 (1968) for a
discussion of the SCP paradigm. See Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, ANTITRUST POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959) for application of the paradigm in the antitrust
context.

9 370 U.S. 294 (1962); id. at 322.
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B. Post-1968 Developments Related to Merger Policy
During the 1970s, the Department brought cases consistent with the 1968
Guidelines, including some where merging parties' market shares only modestly exceeded the Guidelines' thresholds.' 0 In 1977, Donald Baker, then
head of the Antitrust Division, reported that the Department continued to
employ the Guidelines' "clear" thresholds of "4 percent and 4 percent in
concentrated markets and 5 percent and 5 percent in less highly concentrated
ones" when evaluating transactions." The Department spared no sector of
the economy, sometimes challenging minor mergers in local markets. 12
Indeed one scholar identifies several challenges where the merging parties'
market shares were below Guidelines' thresholds.1 3 He also concludes that
there were usually no exceptional circumstances, such as a trend toward concentration, to justify those challenges. He also finds that the government,
although usually victorious, lost most cases in which the merging parties'
market shares were below such thresholds. 14
Successful or not, such challenges could impose significant costs on parties
desiring to merge. Several scholars all find that the announcement of agency
challenges to mergers reduced the wealth of the merging parties, even though
the challenged transactions generally did not threaten to produce market
power.' One scholar finds that the average agency challenge during the period
1950-1972 lasted 34 months and speculates that resulting negative impacts on
firm wealth reflected "direct legal costs, loss of executive time, and uncertainty
affecting business decision-making." 16 Moreover, courts sometimes invoked
the Guidelines as persuasive authority, including in cases between private parties.' 7 It is no surprise that antitrust practitioners reported that the Guidelines

10 For example, in United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich.
1972), the Department challenged a merger between firms with 7.4 and 5.5 percent shares of
a purported eight state market and 2.2 and 1.8 percent shares of the national market.
11 See Donald I. Baker, Government Litigation under Section 7: The Old Merger Guidelines and the
New Antitrust Majority, Remarks before the Southwestern Legal Foundation (February 24
12

1977).
See, e.g., United States v. Guardian Industries, (Civil No. C 73-383) (N.D. Ohio 1973) where

the acquired firm had annual sales of $592,800 in the greater Cleveland market for automobile replacement glass.
13 See Robert A. Rogowsky, The Justice Department'sMerger Guidelines:A Study in the Application

of the Rule, 6 RESEARCHES IN LAW AND EcoNoMICs 135, 137-48, 142 (1984).
14 See id. at 149.
15 B. Espen Eckbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A
Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis, 28 J. L. & ECON. 119 (1985); B. Espen Eckbo,
Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1983); James Ellet,
Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715 (1976).
16 See James Ellet, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715,
724 (1976).
17 See, e.g., Stanley Works

v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972)

and Allis-Chalmers

Manufacturing Company v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 524-25 (3d

Cir. 1969).

Were the 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?

583

influenced firm conduct and deterred some mergers.
Although not "law" in
the conventional sense, the 1968 Guidelines clearly had a regulatory effect.
During the 1970s, numerous empirical analyses and legal developments
served to undermine various aspects of the 1968 Guidelines' methodology. For
instance, the Guidelines had rested upon a strong correlation between market
concentration and market power, purportedly found by Joe Bain and other
adherents to the SCP paradigm.19 However, Harold Demsetz demonstrated
that larger firms in concentrated industries enjoyed greater profit rates than
their smaller rivals within the same market. 20 These findings suggested that any
correlation between profits and concentration reflected scale efficiencies
enjoyed by firms with larger market shares and thus not market power, the latter of which would manifest itself as enhanced profit rates for small and large
firms alike. 21 As a result, Demsetz said, aggressive anti-concentration policy
could actually deprive the economy of significant efficiencies. 22 By the mid1970s, many in the antitrust community questioned the supposed relationship
between market shares and market power. 23 For instance, F.M. Scherer called
into question the assumption that firms exhausted available efficiencies at
modest market shares, concluding that shares of greater than ten percent were
sometimes necessary to exploit fully economies of scale. 24 In 1968, Oliver
Williamson demonstrated that small efficiency improvements resulting from a
merger to monopoly would likely exceed the allocative loss from increased market power and that relegating firms to time-consuming internal expansion could
deprive society of significant benefits. 25 Scholars also identified new efficiencies
relevant to merger policy. One scholar, for instance, emphasized the importance of institutional arrangements that minimized shirking by corporate managers. 26 Several scholars identified the market for corporate control as one such

s See Steven M. Edwards et al., Proposed Revisions of the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1543, 1547-48 (1981).
19 See Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industrial Concentration: American Manufacturing
1936-1940, 65 Q. J. EcoN. 293 (1951).
20 See Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. L. & EcoN.
1
21

(1973).
See id. at 8 ("[I]f an industry is rapidly achieving workable collusive practices there is no reason to suppose that the difference between large and small firm profit rates.").

See id. at 4-9.
23 See Yale Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited, 14J. L. & EcoN. 351
22

(1971); John S. McGhee, Why Not Deregulationfor Antitrust?, 46 ANTITRUST L. J. 777 (1977);

J.
J.

Fred Weston, Section 7 Enforcement: Implementation of Outmoded Theories, 49 ANTITRUST L.
1411 (1980); Steven M. Edwards et al., Proposed Revisions of the Department of Justice's

Merger Guidelines, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1543, 1549-50 (1981).
24 F. M.

Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, 16-54 in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H.J. Goldschmid et al., eds. 1974).
25 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-offs, 58 AM.
26

EcoN. REv. 18 (1968).
Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v. X-Efficiency, 56 AM. EcoN. REv. 392 (1966).
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arrangement, 27 while others contended that strict antimerger regulation could
render this market less effective, because horizontal rivals were best-suited to
identify underperforming managers.28
Not surprisingly, in the mid-1970s, scholars began to study the impact of
enforcement policies that agencies pursued during the 1960s and 1970s. These
studies uniformly found that these policies were unduly aggressive. For
instance, one such study found that while acquiring firms earned abnormal
returns in the years leading up to merger announcements, agency challenges
did not reverse such returns. 29 Moreover, acquired firms earned negative
abnormal returns during the period before merger announcements, leading
Ellert to conclude that the challenged transactions reflected a well-functioning
market for corporate control and not efforts to obtain market power. Studies by
Eckbo, Stillman, and Eckbo and Wier tested two related hypotheses: (1) that
merger announcements would increase the returns of the merging firms' rivals
and (2) that challenges would reduce such returns. 3 0 Each study concluded
that announcements of mergers that the Department chose to challenge during
the 1970s sometimes increased rivals' expected returns, consistent with a
hypothesis that such transactions would result in market power. However, each
study also found that the announcement of such challenges did not affect such
returns. These results suggest that the Department often challenged, under the
aegis of the 1968 Guidelines, transactions posing little or no threat of anticompetitive harm.
Various legal developments also undermined portions of the 1968
Guidelines during the 1970s. In United States v. General Dynamics,3 1 for
instance, the Supreme Court held that defendants could rebut a prima facie
case premised upon market shares that exceeded the Guidelines thresholds
by showing that other attributes of the market and merging parties would
prevent the transaction from producing competitive harm. The Court subsequently confirmed the availability of such a rebuttal, and lower courts also
27 See Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 788-89 (1972); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON,

CORPORATE

CONTROL AND

BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,

97-101

(1970);

Henry

Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
28 Richard A. Posner, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 111 (1976); James Ellert,
Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715, 716 (1976);
Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CAS. WES. L.
REV. 381, 418-19 (1979); J. Fred Weston, Section 7 Enforcement: Implementation of Outmoded
Theories, 49 ANTITRUST L. J. 1411, 1443-49 (1980); Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust
Policy towards Horizontal Mergers, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 225, 226 (1983).
29 See Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. at passim.
30 Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy towards Horizontal Mergers, 11 J. FIN.
EcoN. 225
(1983); B. Espen Eckbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A
Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis, 28 J. L. & ECON. 119 (1985); B. Espen Eckbo,
HorizontalMergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 241 (1983).
3' 415 U.S. 486 (1974).

Were the 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?

585

invoked General Dynamics as a license to consider various factors, including
potential entry, in rebuttal. 32 It is thus no surprise that Ghosal characterizes
General Dynamics as a "landmark" decision that helped usher in a 1974
"regime shift" in the Department's enforcement policy.3 3
A second legal development derived from the Department's efforts to
expand the scope of antimerger law. In the early 1970s, the Department convinced the Supreme Court that the Clayton Act banned certain mergers
between "potential" competitors because the threat of entry by a firm outside
the market could deter anticompetitive activity within it. 3 4 The repeated
invocation of the theory by the enforcement agencies, although rarely successful, presumably enhanced the plausibility of arguments that entry could
counteract a proposed transaction's anticompetitive potential. Not surprisingly lawyers and judges would eventually deploy this logic in ordinary merger cases, contending that the threat of entry should counteract a primafacie
case.3 5 The Supreme Court also announced that the purpose of the antitrust
laws was to promote "consumer welfare" and rejected efforts by firms to
invoke Section 7 to protect themselves from tough competition.3 6 Moreover,
in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, the Court recognized that agreements
once deemed unlawful per se could produce significant efficiencies that courts
should credit when conducting Rule of Reason analysis. 3 ' Ghosal characterizes Sylvania as another "landmark" decision, 3 8 while Leary contends that
recognition of such efficiencies, albeit under the Sherman Act, "cast a long
shadow over merger jurisprudence in lower courts[.]" 3 9

C. The 1982 Merger Guidelines
The election of Ronald Reagan also brought the appointment of William
Baxter as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. Before his
nomination, Baxter had criticized the 1968 Guidelines for reliance on the four
firm concentration index and adoption of low market share thresholds. 40
32

See United States v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120-21 (1975);
United States v. Marine Bank Corporation, 418 U.S.

602, 631 (1974); United States v.

International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 See Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust, 7 J. COMP. L. AND EcoN. 733, 769 (2011).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Toehold Acquisitions and the PotentialCompetition Doctrine, 40 UNIv. CHI. L. REv.

156 (1972).
3

See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984), which
invoked the perceived potential competition doctrine in support of a determination that ease
of entry could undermine a primafacie case.

36 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).

3 433 U.S. 36 (1978).
38 Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust, 7 J. COMP. L. & EcoN. at 769.

3

See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70
ANTITRUST L. J.105, 110 (2002).
40 See Edward Cowan, Antitrust Nominee is Reported, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 7, 1981, p. 33.
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Endorsing the HHI for measuring concentration, he opined that mergers in
markets with HHIs of 1000 or 1100 were problematic if they increased the
HHI by at least 100.41 After his confirmation, Baxter reiterated this belief and
repeatedly reported that the Division was "reworking" the 1968 Guidelines. 42
Announced on Monday June 14, 1982 at a press conference, the new
Guidelines revised the 1968 Guidelines in numerous ways. For instance, the
new Guidelines eschewed reliance upon individual market shares, focusing
solely upon pre- and post-merger concentration and changes in concentration, as measured by HHIs, to determine whether a transaction would presumptively facilitate the collective exercise of market power. As one leading
scholar explained, these new thresholds treated some transactions that would
have been subject to automatic challenge under the 1968 Guidelines as
entirely benign.4 3 For example, a merger in a market with 20 equally sized
firms-resulting in an HHI of 550-contradicted the 1968 Guidelines' strong
presumption against transactions between firms with 5 percent market shares.
By contrast, under the 1982 Guidelines, transactions resulting in HHIs below
1,000 were presumed lawful.4 Moreover, challenges of mergers resulting in
HHIs of 1000 to 1800 were "unlikely," absent an HHI increase of at least 100
points. The 1982 Guidelines also ignored "trends" toward concentration that
had previously justified challenges to otherwise innocuous transactions.
Perhaps most importantly, the concentration-based presumptions in the
1982 Guidelines were quite weak, serving only as the first step in the analysis.
Although the 1968 Guidelines had ignored ease of entry, the new Guidelines
provided that, regardless of concentration or changes therein, the Department
was "unlikely" to challenge a transaction if entry was easy. Where entry was
difficult, the 1982 Guidelines provided that the Department was "more likely
than not" to challenge any transaction producing an HHI over 1000 and
increasing the HHI more than 100. Before deciding on such a challenge, however, the Department would also consider post-merger concentration, the
magnitude of the increase in concentration, and other factors including product heterogeneity, similarity of products produced by merging firms, and
adoption of practices likely to facilitate coordination. If a transaction resulted
in an HHI above 1800 and increased the HHI by 50-100 points, the
Department would again consider these factors when deciding whether to
41 Id.

42 See Harvey M. Applebaum, E. William Barnett, Allen C. Holmes, & Earl E. Pollock, Panel
Discussion and Interview with William Baxter, 50 ANTITRUST L. J. 151 (1981); Hearings on
Oversight of Government Merger Enforcement Policy before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of William J. Baxter) (October 17, 1981).
43 See Thomas Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and

Failure, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 497, 510 n. 30 (1983) (concluding that the 1982 Guidelines' HHIdriven concentration thresholds were significantly more permissive than those contained in

the 1968 Guidelines).
44 So far as we are aware, the Department never challenged a merger that resulted in an HHI of
less than 1000 after the announcement of the 1982 Guidelines.
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challenge the transaction. Finally, the Department was "likely" to challenge
transactions that resulted in HHIs over 1800 and a change greater than 100,
without considering "other factors." Nonetheless, this prediction was still
qualified by the "ease of entry" caveat.
The 1982 Guidelines also recognized a somewhat greater role for efficiencies. The introduction explained that mergers were generally beneficial and
could "penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of
investment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets." A separate section on efficiencies claimed that the new Guidelines would "in the
overwhelming majority of cases... allow firms to achieve available efficiencies
through mergers without interference," apparently because higher concentration thresholds created safe harbors for most transactions producing efficiencies. This section also recognized that efficiencies could justify an otherwise
anticompetitive merger, albeit only in "extraordinary cases." Finally, unlike
the 1968 Guidelines, the 1982 Guidelines elaborated on the standards the
Department would employ when evaluating such a defense, thereby signaling
the Department's willingness to consider seriously efficiency arguments.
In short, the 1982 Guidelines worked a significant change in the Department's
official enforcement policy. Green, for instance, calls the 1982 Guidelines a
"fundamental revision-effectively a rewrite." 45 Leading scholars agreed that
these Guidelines were significantly less interventionist than the 1968
Guidelines. 46 Thus, as written the 1982 Guidelines appeared to be a significant deregulatory shock for a number of American industries.

III. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE 1982
GUIDELINES
Although the 1982 Guidelines departed substantially from the 1968
Guidelines "on paper," the real question from the perspective of regulated
industries and their investors is whether this change resulted in significant
deregulation of mergers in practice. As discussed in the introduction, a
review of the literature suggests two answers to this question. First, some
commentators state or imply that the Guidelines did not alter enforcement
policy. Ghosal, for instance, finds that the Department's merger enforcement
policy, as measured by the number and rate of annual merger challenges,
45 Hillary Green, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse,

48 W. & M. L. REv. 771, 781 (2006).

46 Thomas Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure,

71 CALIF. L. REv. 497, 510 n. 30 (1983); Eleanor Fox, The New Merger Guidelines: A
Blueprint for Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519 (1982); Donald F. Turner,
Observations on the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST L. J. 307
(1982); Hillary Green, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse, 48W. & M. L. REv. 771 (2006) and Louis Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines:
Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or Propagandafor Revision of the

Antitrust Laws? 71 CALIF. L. REv. 575 (1983).
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experienced a single "structural break" between 1959 and 2002, namely, in
1974. 4 He attributes this break, evidenced by a sharp drop in the rate of
merger challenges after 1973, to the powerful Chicago School critique of the
1960s merger enforcement regime, combined with a Supreme Court dominated by Republicans receptive to a more Laissez Faire merger policy. 4 He
also finds that the political affiliation of the President had no significant
impact on the annual number of merger challenges before or after this
change, even as the same political variable exercised increasing influence
over nonmerger civil enforcement policy during the same period.4 " Although
Ghosal does not mention the 1982 Guidelines, his conclusion that there was
no "structural break" in 1982 and finding that the political affiliation of the
President had no impact in the merger context implies that the new
Guidelines had no effect.
Like Ghosal, Leary downplays the impact of Presidential politics, contending that changes in enforcement policy during the 1980s were "foreshadowed
well before the Reagan election in 1980."5o Leary also identifies 1974 as a
key date, because of both General Dynamics and the publication of conference
proceedings that "seriously undercut the case for a merger policy based
strictly on statistical measures of concentration." 5 ' As a result of these and
other developments during the 1970s, he says, "substantial change was inevitable in any event," that is, regardless of who won the 1980 election. 52 Thus,
he concludes, after these changes "the stage was thus set" for William
Baxter's merger policy expressed in the 1982 Merger Guidelines. 3
Indeed, in an April, 1981 interview, Baxter opined that the 1968
Guidelines "could be improved," because they paid "inadequate attention to
entry conditions and other important factors."54 In June of that same year,
Attorney General William French Smith reported that the Department was
"planning to revise the Merger Guidelines issued by the Department in
1968."5' The revisions, he said, "would increase the attention given to entry
47 See Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust, 7 J. COMP. L. & EcoN. 733 (2011).
48

49

Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 771.

50 See Thomas

B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 105, 107 (2002).

51

See id.

at

109

(citing INDUSTRIAL

CONCENTRATION:

THE NEW

LEARNING

(Harvey

J.

Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) (publishing proceedings of 1974 Columbia Law School conference)). Leary also contends that routine review of proposed mergers pursuant to the 1976
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act helped convince the Department "that most mergers did not have the
consequences predicted by once-popular assumptions about oligopoly behavior." See Leary,
EssentialStability of Merger Policy, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. at 111.
52 See id. at 111.

5 See id.
54 See Harvey M. Applebaum, E. William Barnett, Allen C. Holmes, & Earl E. Pollock, Panel
Discussion and Interview with William Baxter, 50 ANTITRUST L. J. 151, 158 (1981).
5 See William F. Smith, Federal Antitrust Enforcement Goals, Remarks before the District of

Columbia Bar (June 24 1981).
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conditions in assessing horizontal mergers." 56 Later that same year, William
Baxter informed House and Senate Committees that, because of new economic thinking and doctrinal evolution, the 1968 Guidelines "were at variance with the state of the law, with current economic knowledge, and with
the Department's actual enforcement practices."' In the same testimony
Baxter also repeated prior statements that the Division was developing new
Guidelines to replace the 1968 version." In the spring of 1982, Smith
reported that the new Guidelines would "memorialize and formalize the standards that are already being used" to evaluate proposed transactions.59
Moreover, even before Baxter's testimony and Smith's second speech, the
Department took an enforcement action that contradicted the 1968
Guidelines and reflected more recent legal and economic developments. In
July, 1981, the Department announced that it was dropping a suit initiated
by the Carter Administration in 1980 challenging the merger of two facing
brick manufacturers in the Northeast. The 1968 Guidelines plainly required
the Department to challenge the transaction, as the merging parties
accounted for fourteen percent and six percent of the market, respectively.
Nonetheless, Baxter's announcement of the voluntary dismissal of the challenge opined that the market was insufficiently concentrated "to support a
prediction that the merger would lessen competition." 60 In short, the initial
complaint followed naturally from the Guidelines, and the dismissal contradicted them, signaling a significantly more permissive policy toward horizontal mergers, along the lines that Baxter had endorsed earlier in the year.
Deregulatory announcements generally take place after a lengthy political
process involving numerous independent actors, with the result that market
actors anticipate regulatory change.6 1 One might argue by analogy that various official statements, along with developments in the case law such as
General Dynamics, the post-1973 reduction in enforcement activity, and the
dismissal of the facing brick merger suit, all signaled to market actors that the
Department's enforcement policy had departed significantly from that
expressed in the 1968 Guidelines well before the June, 1982 announcement
of the new Guidelines. Moreover, these statements also presaged some
aspects of then-current enforcement policy that the new Guidelines would,
as the Attorney General had said, merely "memorialize," such as reliance on

56 Id.

57

See Hearings on Oversight of Government Merger Enforcement Policy before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of William J. Baxter) (October

17, 1981).
id.

58 See

5

See William F. Smith, ChangingEnforcement Policy: Remarks before the American BarAssociation
Antitrust Spring Meeting, 51 ANTITRUST L. J. 95, 97 (1982).
60 See U.S. Drops Trust Suits Against Mack, Two Others, NEW YORI TIMES, July 9, 1981, at Dl.
61 See John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Deregulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND
J.
EcoN. 167 (1985).
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the HHI and greater attention to entry conditions. If so, the official
announcement of the new Guidelines should have had little or no impact
upon the market value of regulated enterprises.
Shortly after the June 14 announcement, various observers declared that
the new Guidelines wrought little or no change in existing enforcement policy.
A June 24 report quoted former enforcement officials and leading practitioners
who opined that the new Guidelines were merely "an embodiment of current
enforcement practice" that "codif[ied] the analysis that [the Department] has
actually been using." 62 Thus, it was said, the new Guidelines recognized
"arguments [practioners] had been making ... for a number of years[,]" with
the result that practitioners "won't do anything differently." 63 A June 17
report in the New York Times recounted that "most experts agree that [the
new Guidelines] contain no bombshells" and paraphrased Baxter's view that
the new standards "just codify and refine the changes that department policy
has undergone since the last guidelines were issued in 1968."64 Indeed, two
leading antitrust practitioners opined on June 21st that the 1982 Guidelines
contained "no real surprises." 65 Baker and Blumenthal concluded that the
1982 Guidelines' higher concentration thresholds were "an accurate reflection
of the government's enforcement policies-not only under the present administration, but as the policies have stood for some time." 66 Overall, they said,
the new Guidelines fell "within the mainstream" when it came to horizontal
mergers and also "adhere [d] fairly closely to the current state of the law on the
standards by which horizontal mergers are to be judged." 67 Any differences
between the Guidelines and current law, they said, were "cosmetic."
There is, however, an alternative account of the impact of the 1982
Guidelines. This account exemplifies the view expressed by Clougherty and
Seldeslachts that changes in merger enforcement policy are "difficult to
anticipate" because they "represent politically-driven exogenous shocks to
merger policy." 69 In this vein, several scholars and practitioners claim or
imply that the 1982 Guidelines did alter enforcement policy. Lawrence White
helped draft the 1982 Guidelines and reports his "horseback sense" that antimerger policy was more lenient during the Reagan Administration than
62 See Antitrust PractitionersReact Favorably to New Merger Guidelines, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REPORTER 1315 (Bureau ofNational Affairs 1982).
63 See id.
64 See Tamar Lewin, Skepticism on Merger Guidelines, NEW YORI TIMES, February 7, 1981, at

Dl.
65 Joe Sims & William Blumenthal, New Merger Guidelines Provide No New Real Surprises, LEGAL

TIMES, June 21, 1982 at 1.
66 Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF.
67
68

L. REv. 311, 332 (1983).
Id.
Id.

69 Joseph A.

Clougherty

& Jo Seldeslachts.

The Deterrence Effects of U.S.

Instruments, 29 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 1114, 1131 (2013).
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before and that such leniency was in part "a product of the somewhat greater
leniency that [was] built into the Guidelines themselves." 70 Another scholar
acknowledges significant evolution in enforcement policy during the 1970s
and also opines that such evolution may well have continued during a second
Carter Administration.7 1 At the same time, he also states that the 1982
Guidelines served as the "conceptual foundation" for the "1980s accelerat
[ion] in the loosening in controls that had begun in the latter half of the
1970s."72 Two other scholars concede that courts and agencies "relaxed...
unduly aggressive antimerger policies of the 1960s," with the result that the
Department brought fewer and narrower cases in the late 1970s.7 3 However,
they also contend that, as of 1980, the line between lawful and unlawful
transactions was "unsettled" and that "no clear articulation [had] emerged of
the evolving narrower view of the reach of Section Seven [of the Clayton
Act]." 7 4 Thus, they say, the Reagan Administration "inherited a merger policy that was in disarray[,]" "vigorously seized their opportunity to alter and
clarify merger policy[,]" and "substantially reshaped merger policy into a
form never seen or administered since the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments." 7 5 They also state that the 1982 Guidelines were part of this effort.
To support this claim, they correctly note that the rate of merger investigations and challenges fell precipitously in 1982-1986 compared with the rate
in 1979-1980.76 Other scholars have asserted that the Department's relaxation of antimerger enforcement mattered a great deal and, in fact, helped
fuel the early 1980s merger boom.' 7
It should also be noted that statements, testimony and enforcement decisions left considerable uncertainty about the precise content of enforcement
policy before the June 14 announcement. For instance, some observers had
surmised that the new Guidelines would treat markets with HHIs over 1,600
as "highly concentrated," while others had speculated that the figure would
70 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Gregg Jarrell, Steven C. Salop, & Lawrence

J. White, Panel
Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy, 311-32 in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach, ed. 1988).
71 William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
71
ANTITRUST L. J. 377, 437-38 (2003).
72 Id. at 435.
n See Thomas Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan
Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 214 (1988).
74 Id.

7 Id.
76 Id. at 213.

7

See e.g. William G. Shepherd, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS, 211 (1991) (attributing
"greatest merger wave" to "more lenient Reagan policies toward mergers [which] stirred a
vast, frenzied merger boom."); id. at 212 (claiming that "enforcement activity virtually
ceased" during the 1980s); id. at 221 (describing "[n]ew guidelines issued in 1982 and 1984"
as establishing more permissive enforcement standards); Linda Brewster Stearns and
Kenneth D. Allan, Economic Behavior in InstitutionalEnvironments: The Corporate Merger Wave
of the 1980s, 61 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 699, 703-706 (1996).

592

Journalof Competition Law & Economics

be 2,000. Moreover, market actors are interested in more than just the content of current enforcement policy. They also care about the stability and durability of that policy. Once detailed guidelines are in place, agencies that wish
to alter enforcement policy must incur the cost of drafting new guidelines or
suffer the reputational consequences of taking (new) enforcement positions that
contradict standing guidelines. Thus, the issuance of new guidelines can function as a credible commitment that the policy contained therein will be more
durable than a policy communicated by a series of enforcement decisions,
speeches and congressional testimony. Even if they simply replicated exactly an
enforcement policy that was already in place, the 1982 Guidelines presumably
sent an important signal about the durability of that policy.

IV. TESTING THE IMPACT OF THE 1982 GUIDELINES
Most who opine about the impact of the 1982 Guidelines offer little or no hard
evidence to support their views. Those who do offer evidence generally focus
on the raw number of annual merger challenges or the ratio of such challenges
to the overall number of mergers. 7" However, as White observes, such metrics
may not be useful proxies for the substantive content of enforcement policy, as
"the clarity or fuzziness of a standard" may have far greater impact on the number of challenges than the standard's substantive content.so
Unlike other proponents of alternative views, Sapozhinikov attempts a
rigorous empirical test of the impact of various sets of Merger Guidelines on
the number and type of mergers in the U.S. economy. 1 She begins by positing that changes in merger enforcement policy are "not abrupt but rather
gradual," and that any variable that serves as a proxy for such change must
reflect its continuous and evolving nature. Her model therefore employs a
splined time trend variable as a proxy for changes in government policy
toward mergers. The quarterly time trend variable is splined in the quarter
following the issuance of new Guidelines in 1968, 1982, 1984 and other
times. The study concludes that a 1982 change in enforcement policy resulted
in increased horizontal and conglomerate merger activity and that the impact

Justice Department Unveils Long-Awaited Revisions to Merger Guidelines; FTC Issues
Statement on Mergers, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORTER 1251 (Bureau of National
Affairs 1982); James Campbell, Steven M. Edwards, & James Egan, Panel Discussion: Merger
Guidelines: Proposals for Change, New York State Bar Association 1982 Antitrust Law
Symposium (January 27. 1982); Robert E. Taylor, U.S. Eases Merger Guidelines, Allowing
Somewhat More ConcentratedMarkets, Wall Street Journal (June 15 1982).

78 See

7 See, e.g., Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust, 7 J. COMP. L. & EcoN. 733, 748 (2011) and
Thomas Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan
Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 214 (1988).
so See Joseph A. Grundfest, Gregg Jarrell, Steven C. Salop, & Lawrence J. White, Panel
Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy, 311-332 in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach, ed. 1988).
s1 Margarita Sapozhinikov, Mergers and Government Policy, Boston College Working Papers in
Economics, Series Number 656 (unpublished manuscript 2006).
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of the change grew over time. At the same time, an alternate specification of
the same change, namely, a binary dummy that takes on a positive value in
the third quarter of 1982, generates a negative and insignificant result.
The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the 1982
Guidelines were perceived as a real change in enforcement policy that would
result in substantial deregulation of mergers throughout the economy. More
specifically, we test whether market actors perceived the guidelines as a
deregulatory change by examining the market capitalization of firms subject to
U.S. merger policy. If the guidelines are perceived as a real policy change, the
market should recognize the increased prospect of mergers that could produce
private benefits by creating market power, generating efficiencies, or both.
Thus, rational investors should bid up the prices of those companies now
more likely to engage in mergers producing such benefits. Additionally, as
some scholars have noted, rivals might have a comparative advantage in identifying mismanaged firms, with the result that reducing antitrust barriers to
horizontal transactions could increase the probability that mismanaged firms
would be the target of hostile takeovers, reduce anticipated agency costs and
increase expected profitability. 8 2 Anticipating these effects, investors should
again bid up the share prices of deregulated firms. The second such effect, it
should be noted, would not manifest itself as a change in the number of
enforcement actions or actual mergers. Thus, our analysis is designed to capture an impact of regulatory change that other methodologies would miss.
We employ the standard event study methodology described by
MacKinlay and Bhagat and Romano to test this hypothesis. 3 Event studies
are used to analyze the behavior of firm stock prices around a particular event
to determine whether or not the event results in a change in the stock's performance. Event studies are a mainstay in the financial literature but are also
employed widely in other areas including the field of law and economics.
The structure of an event study is relatively straightforward. In the market
model, a pre-event estimation window is used to model the relationship
between the firm's stock price and some measure of the overall market. Let
Ri, be the price of firm i's stock at time t and M, a measure of the overall market at time t. An ordinary least squares regression is then used to estimate
Ri, = ai + iM, + e g,

82 See, e.g., Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy towards Horizontal Mergers,
11

83

J. FIm.
EcoN. 225 (1983). See also n. 28, supra (collecting authorities contending that horizontal rivals were well-positioned to identify and acquire firms directed by shirking managers).
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I Technique and Corporate
Litigation, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event
Studies and the Law: Part II: EmpiricalStudies and Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 380

(2002); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies and Finance, 35J. ECON. LIT. 13 (1997). See also
Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, Ch. 3.5.1 in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNoMICs (Francisco Parisi ed., Oxford 2017).
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where ai and ,Di are firm-specific coefficients and ei is the error term for all of
the trading days during the estimation window. This model is called a market
model because the M, variable controls for changes in the price of the stock
that are due to market-wide factors.
The researcher then identifies a period of time around the event to be
studied-an event window-during which a stock market response, if any, to
the event is expected. The estimated coefficients for firm i are then used in
conjunction with the market measures, M, to predict the expected return for
firm i, that is
E [Rh] = ai + /}(Mi
for all trading days during the event window. The abnormal return for firm i
on a given day during the event window, Ai1 , is the difference between the
actual price for firm i's stock and the predicted price, or
Ai, = Rh, - E [R] = Rh, - a-

/iM,.

For event windows longer than a day, the researcher usually computes the
cumulative abnormal return as the sum of the daily abnormal returns across
the period of the event window. If the event has no systematic effect on the
firm's stock price, in expectation the mean abnormal return should be zero.
The researcher can perform statistical tests on either the daily or cumulative
abnormal returns against the null hypothesis that mean abnormal performance equals zero. Alternatively the researcher can use the cumulative abnormal return as the dependent variable in a cross-section regression, as we do
in this paper, to determine whether firm characteristics systematically affect a
firm's cumulative abnormal return during the event window.
Our sample for the analysis consists of publicly traded firms that were part
of the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 Index at the time of the announcement,
as identified in the 1982 Stock Market Encyclopedia of the S&P 500.8 Thus
we began with 500 firms in our sample. We then excluded four firms from
the sample that were themselves the results of recent mergers. Next we
dropped twelve firms from the sample because they were not traded on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and their prices are reported differently
from those of firms traded on the NYSE. Finally, we excluded six firms from
the sample because we were unable to obtain a complete set of stock market
prices for the period we studied. This left 477 firms in our sample. For the
analysis, we utilize two different estimation windows to estimate the coefficients that we subsequently employ to predict the expected price of each
firm's stock during the event window. The first estimation window (EST30)
84 STANDARD

(1982).

AND POOR'S CORPORATION, STOCK MARKET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE S&P 500
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begins 60 trading days before the June 14, 1982 announcement and ends 30
trading days before the announcement (March 18, 1982 through April 30,
1982). The second estimation window (EST300) begins 330 trading days
before the announcement and also ends 30 trading days before the
announcement (April 6, 1981 through April 30, 1982). Following the market
model, we regress the daily returns of each firm during the estimation windows against a daily market index. We use two different market indices for
our analysis, the Wilshire 5000 and the S&P 5 0 0 ."5
We also use two different event windows: the first (EV5) begins two trading
days before the announcement and ends two trading days after the announcement (June 10, 1982 through June 16, 1982), while the second (EV9) begins
four trading days before the announcement and ends four trading days after
(June 8, 1982 through June 18, 1982). Again following standard methodology,
we use the estimation coefficients from the market model regressions to predict
returns for each firm's stock during the event window. We then compare the
daily predicted returns with actual returns and calculate cumulative abnormal
returns for the two event windows for each firm in our sample.
To test the effect of the announcement of the 1982 Guidelines on firms'
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), we estimate a standard cross-sectional
treatment effects model. We use data on firm and industry characteristics
including the firm's nationality, the primary industry in which the firm participates, whether a particular industry is exempt from antitrust regulation of
mergers, and concentration measures for various industries to identify potential control groups that are unlikely to be affected by the announcement of the
1982 Guidelines.8 6 We then compare the CARs of the control group with
those of the treatment group using a simple ordinary least squares regression
with a binary treatment dummy.
We constructed a series of different treatment/control groups for the analysis. In particular, we sought to identify different control groups that,
because of observable characteristics, should be unaffected by the new
Guidelines. Following Black and Khanna (2007) and Litvak (2007), we

85
86

Data on daily stock prices and the two market indices were obtained from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
We took the data on firm nationality and jurisdiction of incorporation from the 1982 Stock
Market Encyclopedia of the S&P 500. We found each firm's primary industry, defined at the
four digit level, in the 1981 Ward's Directory of the 55,000 Largest U.S Corporations. See
WARD'S DIRECTORY OF 55,000 LARGEST U.S. CORPORATIONS (1981). We obtained the
HHIs at the four digit level for manufacturing firms from the 1982 Census of Manufactures.
See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES (1985). For nonmanu-

facturing firms, we obtained firm-level sales data for industries defined at the three digit SIC
level from the 1981 Ward's Directory. We used these data to calculate HHIs for each nonmanufacturing industry with one or more firms in our sample. We then attributed the resulting
HHIs to each nonmanufacturing firm in the industry in question. As a result, two nonmanufacturing firms that occupy the same industry defined at the three digit SIC level would
exhibit the same HHI, even if each occupies a different four digit SIC industry.
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identified groups that could serve as benchmarks for comparison to the
remaining firms in the sample whose observed characteristics made their
returns more susceptible to the announcement. 1 Table 1 presents our
results for various models (that is, treatment/control groups) for four different sets of estimation/event window parameters. In each regression, standard errors are clustered at the SIC code level.
Model 1 is the baseline model and does not employ a treatment group.
Model 2's treatment group includes all firms in industries subject to the
Clayton Act, excluding energy utilities, telecommunications firms, and firms
in industries with HHI's greater than 1800. Because both airlines (SIC 4511)
and railroads (SIC 4011) were exempt from the Clayton Act during this period, they are part of the control group.S Additionally, firms headquartered
outside the United States are in the control group as presumably most mergers involving such firms only implicate foreign markets and are thus beyond
the effective scope of U.S. antitrust regulation. Thus, changes in U.S. law or
enforcement policy should have little, if any, impact upon such firms' merger
prospects and thus firm value. 9 Energy utilities and telecommunications
firms are also included in the control group. Until the 1990s regulatory constraints confined the operation of energy utilities to particular states, thus
severely limiting if not completely denying their ability to merge.9 0 Indeed,
nearly all telecommunications firms also enjoyed statutory monopolies confined to particular states during this period." Hence, a change in merger

87 See Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance
Reforms Increase

8

Firms' Market Values? Evidence from India, 4 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749 (2007);
Katherine Litvak, The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in
the U.S, 13J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007).
The Department of Transportation possessed exclusive jurisdiction to review airline mergers
pursuant to a less interventionist standard than that contained in the Clayton Act. See
WILLARD K. Tom, ANTITRUST LAw

DEVELOPMENTS

(THIRD),

1145-46

(American Bar

Association 1992); Marvin C. Cohen, Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28
ANTITRUST BULL. 131 (1983); Comment, The Airline Merger Cases: CAB Application of
Section 7 after Deregulation, 12 TRANSP. L. J. 139 (1980). This authority expired in 1988, at
which point the Clayton Act, enforced by the Department of Justice, applied to airlines. See
TOM, ANTITRUST
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Interstate Commerce Commission possessed exclusive jurisdiction over railroad mergers pursuant to a "public interest" standard during this period.
s Similarly, one scholar uses Canadian firms as a control group to test the impact of U.S. merger enforcement policy on vertical mergers. See B. Espen Eckbo, Mergers and the Value of
Antitrust Deterrence, 47 J. FIN. 1005 (1992).
90 See David A. Becher, J. Harold Mulherin, & Ralph A. Walking, Sources of Gains in Corporate
Mergers: Refined Tests from a Neglected Industry, 47 J. FIN. AND QUANT. ANAL. 57, 59 (2012).
91 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required states to cease granting such monopolies. See
PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG AND JOHN THORNE, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ACT OF 1996 (1996). Additionally, the United States did not challenge a single merger in the
telecommunications or energy utility industry, although the 1968 Guidelines were in effect.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1982 MERGER CASE DIGEST (1984).
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Table 1. Regression results for the cumulative abnormal return treatment effects models
Estimation window
Event window
Estimation price index

EST30
EV5

EST30
EV9

EST300
EV5

EST30
EV5

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

S&P
500

-3.17*
(1.50)

-6.41*
(2.77)

-3.47*
(1.59)

-8.33*
(1.25)

-2.77
(3.77)
-1.25
(3.40)

-5.67
(6.81)
-2.48
(6.08)

-1.46
(3.85)
-2.46
(3.42)

-0.20
(2.89)
-8.19*
(2.51)

8.82*
(2.74)
-4.24*
(1.62)

17.41*
(5.25)
-8.53*
(2.96)

7.80*
(2.98)
-4.42*
(1.73)

6.78*
(2.29)
-9.15*
(1.37)

13.07*
(4.37)
-10.01+
(5.48)
3.66
(5.07)

25.60*
(8.42)
-18.52+
(9.53)
6.03
(8.62)

11.67*
(4.27)
-9.06*
(4.44)
2.73
(3.86)

8.08*
(2.80)
-5.56+
(3.09)
-4.65+
(2.68)

Model 1
Constant
Model 2
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with
HHI < 1800 (N= 331)
Constant

Model 3
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with
1000 < HHI < 1800 (N= 58)
Constant

Model 4
Firms in industries with 1000 < HHI < 1800
(N = 64)
Nonutilities, subj. to CA (N= 409)
Constant

OLS regression, std. errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 4-digit SIC code level. CA , Clayton
Act.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
+Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

enforcement policy would have no deregulatory effect impacting the market
value of such firms.
The final group of firms in the Model 2 control group are firms in highly
concentrated industries, that is, where high concentration is defined as industries with HHIs of 1800 or more. The rationale for using these firms as controls is that both sets of Guidelines were hostile to transactions in highly
concentrated markets, with the result that the 1982 change would have little
or no impact on firms in such markets. More specifically, although the 1982
Guidelines do not explicitly condemn mergers in industries with HHI's
above 1800, they do condemn mergers in such industries that produce an
increase in the HHI over 100 points. Although there are two potential
defenses for challenged mergers-that new entry would counteract any anticompetitive effects or that the merger produced significant efficiencies that
counteracted any harm-for mergers in highly concentrated markets, these
defenses would not be easy to argue. 92 Thus, the 1982 Guidelines would still
92 For instance, to the extent concentration reflected scale or other economies, merger proponents invoking purported ease of entry would have to establish that new entrants could
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have required a challenge to the majority of significant mergers resulting in
an HHI over 1800 where the change in the HHI exceeded 100. To determine the HHI for the industries in our analysis, we followed other scholars
and treated manufacturing industries defined by 4-digit SIC codes as relevant markets.9 3 For nonmanufacturing firms, we employed 3-digit SIC codes
4
to identify such markets. 9
For Model 3, we expanded the control group by adding all firms in
unconcentrated industries, defining as "unconcentrated" industries with
HHIs below 1000. The rationale for adding these firms to the control group
rests on the assumption, articulated by one scholar, that enforcement policy
evolved in a less interventionist direction during the late 1970s.9 5 If so, the
announcement of the 1982 Guidelines would not impact the merger prospects of firms in these industries, as mergers between such firms were
unlikely to be targeted in the early 1980s even if they contravened the 1968
Guidelines. 96 This expansion could also accommodate the possibility that

9

capture a significant share of the market's sales shortly after entering the market. Moreover,
the 1982 Guidelines required merger proponents to prove any efficiencies by clear and convincing evidence and required greater efficiencies the greater the level of concentration.
Finally, the 1982 Guidelines provided that the Department would "resolve close cases in favor
of challenging the merger" when the resulting HHI was over 1800.
See e.g. Joseph A. Clougherty & Jo Seldeslachts, The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy
Instruments, 29J. L., ECON. & ORG. 1114 (2013); Margarita Sapozhinikov, Mergers and
Government Policy, Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Series Number 656
(unpublished manuscript 2006); B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and
Stockholder Wealth, 11J. FIN. EcoN. 241 (1983); Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to
Industrial Concentration: American Manufacturing 1936-1940, 65 Q. J. EcoN. 293 (1951).
Some have contended that the industries identified by four digit SIC Codes can be poor proxies for relevant antitrust markets. See e.g. Russell W. Pittman & Gregory J. Werden, The
Divergence of SIC Codes from Antitrust Markets: Indications from Department of Justice Merger
Cases, 33 EcoN. LETTERS 283 (1990). However, critics admit that "hundreds" of articles in
the industrial organization literature have employed four digit SIC Codes in this manner. See
Gregory J. Werden, The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets: Some Evidence
From Price Fixing Cases, 28 EcoN. LETTERS 139 (1988). Moreover, if contemporary market
actors perceived that regulators would act as though such categories correspond to relevant
markets, they presumably treated such categories as relevant markets for the purpose of assessing whether a contemplated transaction was subject to challenge. In this connection, it
should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission's compilation of large mergers consummated between 1949 and 1979 classified such transactions by four digit SIC Code and treated
as "horizontal" mergers between firms sharing the same such code. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMIssioN,

BUREAU

OF

EcoNoMICs

STATISTICAL

REPORT

ON

MERGERS

AND

ACQUISITIONS 1979 (1981). However, the same compilation also treated as horizontal some
transactions between firms with different four digit codes.
94 Ideally, we would have used four digit SIC codes for nonmanufacturing industries as well.
However, we were unable to obtain the necessary data to compute HHIs for nonmanufacturing industries at the four digit SIC code level.
9 See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 105, 111 (2002).
96 However, one scholar contends that the Department continued to challenge transactions in
unconcentrated markets into the early 1980s. See Robert A. Rogowsky, The Justice
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Baxter's own statements and enforcement decisions signaled that the
Department's enforcement policy had changed in a deregulatory direction
before the Department announced the new 1982 Guidelines. If one or both
of these surmises is correct, then inclusion of such firms in the control group
is warranted. For this final model, the control group encompasses the majority of firms, 419, leaving only 58 firms in the treatment group.
We turn now to the results of these models as shown in Table 1. For each
model, we provide a brief description of the treatment dummy and indicate
the number of firms in the treatment group. We also show the results for
four different combinations of three parameters (that is, estimation window,
event window, estimation price index). Results for the other parameter sets
were generally consistent with those for the parameter sets shown and are
available from the authors upon request. We begin by noting that the baseline
Model 1 shows significant negative coefficients for the constant term across
all four sets of parameters shown in the Table. These results suggest that the
S&P 500 firms as a group experienced negative CARs relative to both market
indices during the event window.9 7 Turning next to Model 2, which has the
largest treatment group and smallest control group, note that the treatment
group does not have a significant coefficient for any of the four sets of parameters and the constant only has a significant coefficient for the final set of
parameters. However, all of the coefficients are negative and the combined
value of the two coefficients in Model 2 is similar to the value of the coefficient on the constant term in Model 1.
Model 3 exhibits a very different pattern. For all four sets of parameters,
the coefficient on the treatment dummy is positive and statistically significant
and the coefficient on the constant term is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the positive coefficient on the treatment dummy is relatively
large-for three of the four sets of treatment parameters (those using the
Wilshire 5000 market index) it is larger than the negative coefficient on the
constant term, thereby resulting in a net positive CAR for firms in the Model
3 treatment group. These results suggest that announcement of the 1982
Guidelines functioned as a deregulatory shock for the Model 3 treatment
group. Recall that this treatment group consists of firms that are not exempt
from antitrust regulation of mergers, are not state-regulated utilities, and are
in industries with HHIs between 1000 and 1800. These firms experienced
significantly positive CARs during the event window.
There are two defining characteristics for firms in the Model 3 treatment
group: the market concentration for the industries in which the firms operate

9

Department's Merger Guidelines: A Study in the Application of the Rule, 6 RESEARCHES IN LAW
AND EcoNoMICs 135, 154-59 (1984).
We do use value-weighted market indices. Theoretically, a relatively small shift in the price of
a large company can heavily influence the value of the index when prices are weighted by firm
value. However, we also find a significant negative coefficient on the constant term when we
use equal-weighted indices.
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and the fact that federal merger policy is in force for these firms. To determine which characteristic is driving the results, we created an additional
model, Model 4, with two different treatment dummies: one for firms with
HHIs between 1,000 and 1,800 (including exempt firms, energy utilities, and
telecommunications firms in such industries) and one for firms that are neither energy utilities nor telecommunications firms nor exempt from the
Clayton Act. The overlap of these two groups includes the 58 firms in the
Model 3 treatment group. Interestingly, the coefficient on the dummy for
firms in industries with HHIs between 1000 and 1800 is positive and significant showing that these firms had higher CARs than firms in either unconcentrated or highly concentrated industries. The coefficient on firms in the
second group is negative and significant. Thus, it appears that differences in
market concentration, and not membership in particular industries, drives
the results in Model 3. These results suggest that the announcement of the
1982 Merger Guidelines resulted in a positive increase in firm value for firms
with HHIs between 1,000 and 1,800 that were subject to Clayton Act regulation during this period.
Comparing results across the four different parameter sets, note that in all
cases the signs and significance of coefficients is consistent across the three
parameter sets that use the Wilshire 5000 index. Thus, the use of a longer
event window or a longer estimation window has no effect on our qualitative
findings. Of course, using a longer event window results in quantitatively larger coefficients, since the number of trading days over which the CARs are
summed is higher. In comparison, the use of a longer estimation window
does not result in any consistent change to the size of the coefficients. The
use of the S&P 500 Index instead of the Wilshire 5000 index does result in a
significant coefficient on the constant term in three of the models.
Additionally, in all models, the coefficient on the constant in the S&P 500
parameter set is lower than those in the Wilshire 5000 parameters sets, indicating a larger negative CAR for firms in the control groups of each model.
This suggests that the Wilshire 5000 serves as a better predictor of market
driven price changes for firms in the control group than the S&P 500.

V. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL TESTS
The results for Models 3 and 4 tend to support the second, alternative account
of the impact of the 1982 Merger Guidelines. That is, these results suggest that
promulgation of the 1982 Guidelines conveyed important new information to
market actors about the content of the Department's merger enforcement policy. In particular, these actors perceived the announcement as a signal of a
more relaxed enforcement posture vis a vis firms in industries with HHIs
between 1000 and 1800. Note that for these firms, the 1982 Guidelines articulate a substantially less intrusive enforcement policy than their 1968 predecessors on paper, and that market actors apparently interpreted the announcement
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Table 2. Sensitivity analysis for market concentration
Estimation window
Event window
Estimation price index

EST30
EV5

EST30
EV9

EST300
EV5

EST30
EV5

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

S&P
500

Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with 1800 <

-3.56

-6.02

-5.13

-3.91+

HHI (N= 78)
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with 1000 <
HHI < 1800 (N= 58)
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with 500 <
HHI < 1000 (N= 83)

Constant

(3.26)

(5.98)

7.54*

14.73*

(3.66)

(6.73)

(3.08)
6.13+

(3.46)

(2.39)
5.62*

(2.69)

-3.06

-7.87

-3.59

-2.18

(3.18)
-2.97+
(1.57)

(5.84)
-5.85*
(2.88)

(3.01)
-2.76+
(1.48)

(3.33)
-7.99*
(1.15)

OLS regression, std. errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 4-digit SIC code level. CA, Clayton
Act.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
+Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

as a relaxation of a regulatory regime previously hostile to horizontal mergers.
Moreover, these actors perceived this relaxation immediately upon the
announcement of the new guidelines and did not wait for the Department to
generate additional signals about the content of enforcement policy.
To further explore our results, we conducted a number of different robustness checks. We began by examining the role that market concentration plays
in the results by running an additional regression with three potential treatment groups. For all three groups, we only include firms subject to the
Clayton Act, except energy utilities and telecommunications firms. The first
group includes the 78 of those firms that are in industries with HHI's greater
than 1800. The second group includes the 58 of those firms that are in industries with HHI's between 1000 and 1800 (that is, the Model 3 treatment
group), and the third group includes the 83 of those firms that are in industries with HHI's between 500 and 1000. The results of this regression are presented in Table 2. Note that the coefficient for those firms in industries
between 1000 and 1800 is consistently positive and significant, similar to the
results for Models 3 and 4 in Table 1. The coefficients on the other two
groups are consistently negative, as is the coefficient on the constant term,
although only the coefficient on the constant term is consistently significant.
Thus, these results confirm our earlier results that the group of S&P 500 firms
in moderately concentrated industries experienced an increase in stock market
returns after the announcement of the new Merger Guidelines while firms in
more or less concentrated industries did not. This finding is consistent with
investors believing that the new Guidelines did not significantly alter the prospect of merger enforcement for firms in industries with HHIs between 500
and 1000 or for firms in industries with HHIs above 1800.
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Recall that for manufacturing industries, we used 4-digit SIC codes to define
relevant markets for determining concentration levels, although due to data limitations, we used 3-digit SIC codes to define markets for nonmanufacturing
industries. As another robustness check, we reran various models using concentration data for manufacturing industries derived from the same source and, in
the same manner, as for nonmanufacturing industries. In particular, we
assigned manufacturing industries concentration levels derived from the 3-digit
SIC codes. Generally speaking, the signs on the various coefficients were the
same as in the original runs. At the same time, fewer of these coefficients were
significant. These results are not surprising, given that reliance on broader markets is less likely to replicate the actual antitrust markets and would therefore
produce less precise results.S As another sensitivity analysis, we added Market
Valuation as a proxy for firm size and included this variable in Model 3, both
on its own and interacted with the treatment dummy. The results for these
regressions are provided in Table 3.9 Neither the coefficients on Market
Valuation alone nor the coefficients on the Treatment*Market Valuation interaction are ever significant. However, the coefficients on the Treatment dummy
alone continue to be positive and statistically significant.
One common concern with event studies is whether one has actually identified the appropriate event around which to look for a market reaction. In
particular, and as noted previously, Binder cautions that regulatory event
studies pose a particular challenge because various steps in the political and
regulatory process leading to regulatory change can signal the possibility and
nature of potential change to capital markets. 100 After studying the impact of
regulatory and deregulatory announcements in different industries, Binder
concludes that "it is extremely difficult to find announcements in the regulatory process that are unanticipated by the market." 1 01 We note that this criticism suggests that the results we find here are likely to underestimate the
true impact of the 1982 Guidelines. However, we nonetheless sought to
investigate whether pre-1982 events could have anticipated the 1982
announcement. Thus, we examined the impact of arguably the most signifi102
cant other deregulatory event, the 1981 dismissal of the facing brick suit.
As noted in Section 3, this suit, brought in the waning days of the Carter
Administration, challenged a transaction between firms of relatively modest
market shares that plainly contravened the 1968 Guidelines. It is possible
that Baxter's public and widely reported dismissal of a case brought so
recently by the preceding Administration signaled that enforcement policy
9
9

Results available from the authors upon request.
Due to missing data on shares outstanding, there is one fewer observation in this regression.
The omitted firm is an energy utility and would have been in the control group.
100 See John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Deregulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND J.
EcoN. 167 (1985).
101 See id. at 181.
102 See n. 60, supra and accompanying text (discussing Baxter's decision to dismiss this case).

Were the 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?

603

Table 3. Sensitivity analysis for market valuation
Estimation window
Event window
Estimation price index

EST30
EV5

EST30
EV9

EST300
EV5

EST30
EV5

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

S&P
500

Treatment: nonutilities, subj. to CA, 1000 <

10.47*

20.40*

10.57*

9.69*

HHI < 1800 (N = 58)
Market valuation ($million)

(4.36)
0.16
(0.35)
-1.20
(1.59)
-4.53*
(1.36)

(8.01)
0.34
(0.64)
-1.84
(2.93)
-9.12*
(2.50)

(4.12)
0.23
(0.33)
-1.72
(1.50)
-4.81*
(1.29)

(3.19)
0.02
(0.26)
-1.81
(1.17)
-9.21*
(1.00)

Treatment x market valuation ($million)
Constant

OLS regression, std. errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 4-digit SIC code level. CA, Clayton
Act.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
+Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

had changed in a significant fashion. We tested this possibility by rerunning
our various models with estimation and event windows built around the date
the Department announced it was dismissing this suit. We found no significant effects on any model's treatment group.10 3 This result suggests that this
announcement had a substantially smaller impact upon the regulatory expectations of market participants than the announcement of the new Guidelines.
Additionally, we ran two falsification tests for randomly selected dates
50-100 days before and after the announcement and found no statistically
significant effects for any of the treatment groups. If some other factor (such
as a "takeover premium") unrelated to the announcement of the new
Guidelines made firms in industries with HHIs between 1000 and 1800
uniquely attractive to investors, we would expect to observe similar results
for the randomly selected days which we do not.
We also scrutinized the event window for other developments that could
somehow account for the results we obtained. A review of the "What's News"
section of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on the event date as well as two business days before and after the date revealed no events that seemed likely to
uniquely affect the moderately concentrated industries in the Model 3 treatment group. However, this review of events did identify the June 14 ceasefire in
the Falkland Islands War and formal surrender of Argentine forces on the same
day (just over three weeks after British troops landed on the islands) as a possible confounding event. Major newspapers, including the WSJ, reported the
surrender and ceasefire on June 15, although some market actors apparently
received the news on the afternoon of June 14.104 However, the S&P 500 fell
103 Results available from authors upon
request.

104 A WSJ article on June 15, 1982 reported that "the [June 14] slide continued despite late
reports of a cease-fire in the Falkland Islands." See Victor J. Hillery, Broad Decline in Slow
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0.25 percent on June 15, the first full trading day after announcement of the
ceasefire, and WSJ's June 16th account of the previous day's market activity
did not mention the Falklands War. In any event, the end of the Falklands War
could only account for our results if that event's effect on the treatment group
differed from its effect on the control group. Any market-wide effect of the
ceasefire announcement (or any other event) would be captured in the coefficient on the model's constant term. Moreover, only a differential positive effect
upon stocks in the treatment group would constitute an alternative explanation
for our results, as a negative effect would indicate that our results were an
underestimate of the impact of the announcement of the 1982 Guidelines on
the treatment group.
A review of media reports leading up to the May 21 British landings on
the Falklands suggested that market actors believed that a prolonged military
conflict would negatively affect the economy of the United Kingdom, a major
U.S trading partner, by weakening the British pound and causing higher
interest rates, inducing a tax increase to pay for military operations and/or
destabilizing the Thatcher government.1 0 The ceasefire following a rapid
British victory presumably moderated these concerns, brightening prospects
for the United Kingdom's economy. A stronger British economy would, in
turn, increase U.S. exports to the UK and expected profits of exporting
firms. Even if one assumes that firms in the Model 3 treatment group were
particularly reliant on exports to the United Kingdom, any plausible estimate
of the ceasefire's impact would be minuscule compared with the positive
abnormal returns we observed. 106
We also considered the possibility that the cessation of the Falklands War
could have impacted not only trade with the UK, but also international trade
more globally. Once again, for this to explain the positive coefficient we find
on the treatment group dummy, the improvement in prospects for international trade had to affect our treatment group differentially. To assess the
likelihood of this possibility, we conducted three additional analyses. First,
we sought to examine the relative import intensity of industries represented
in our control and treatment groups based on the expectation that domestic
firms in import-heavy industries would benefit from disturbances that disrupt
global trade and thus would experience reduced returns upon the elimination
of such disturbances. Using data from 1982 to 1987, one scholar identifies

Trading Day Is Triggered by Interest Rate Fears, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 15, 1982, at p.
55.
105 See David Brand, British Economy Could Be Victim If a War Begins, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
April 21, 1982, at 33.
106 U.S. exports to the UK totaled about $10.6 billion in 1982, while U.S. GNP
was just over
$3 trillion. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES, 845 (1984) (export figures); id. at 448 (GNP figures). Thus UK exports accounted
for less than four tenths of one percent of US GNP in 1982. Even a ten percent increase in
such exports would increase US GNP by less than four one-hundredths of one percent.
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import-sensitive manufacturing industries at the 4-digit SIC code level. 107
Using this information, we first assessed whether there was a statistically significant difference in the percentage of manufacturing firms in the treatment
group and control groups that were import-sensitive and found that the difference was not statistically significant at conventional levels, although the
percentage was slightly lower for the treatment group (12.2% compared with
12.7%). Next, we reran Model 3 for manufacturing firms only, with a dummy variable for firms in import-sensitive industries.'os As shown in Table 4,
although the coefficient on Import-Intensive Industry has the expected negative sign, it is not significant for any of the four parameter sets. More importantly for our analysis, the coefficient on the treatment dummy continues to
be positive and significant for all four parameter sets. Thus, we continue to
observe moderately concentrated firms in industries subject to the Clayton
Act exhibiting a positive cumulative abnormal return during the event win0 9
dow surrounding the announcement of the 1982 Guidelines.
We next examined relative export intensity under the expectation that any
increased difficulty in trading will differentially impact those firms that derive
a significant percentage of sales from exports, with the result that reversal of
such events will differentially increase the expected profits of such firms. We
again used data on export intensity for 4-digit manufacturing firms from
1982 to 1987 and, as was the case with import sensitivity, the percentage of
Model 3 treatment firms in export-sensitive manufacturing industries is not
statistically significantly different from the percentage of control firms,
although in absolute terms, there are more export-sensitive firms in the treatment group than in the control group (21.2% vs. 14.5%, respectively). 1 10 As
we did in the import analysis, we reran Model 3 for manufacturing firms
only with a dummy variable for firms in export-sensitive industries. As shown
in Table 4, the coefficient on export-intensive industry is negative and significant. Although this is not consistent with our expectations, note that the
coefficient on the treatment dummy continues to be positive and significant
107 See Robert W. Bedzamik, An Analysis of U.S. Industries Sensitive to Foreign Trade, 1982-1987,
116 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 15 (1993). Bednarzik only considers manufacturing industries. He
defines import-intensive industries as those with an average import-penetration of 30 percent
or more. Although many nonmanufacturing industries also export (agriculture, mining, etc.)
many do not (utilities, services industries, etc.).
10s Although only 60 percent of the whole sample are manufacturing firms (287 firms), the
Model 3 results for the manufacturing only firms are very similar to the results for all 477
firms.
1o9 We repeated this analysis using data on 1972-1979 import sensitivity from a previous analysis. See Gregory K. Schoepfle, Imports and Domestic Employment: Identifying Affected
Industries, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13 (1982). The results were qualitatively the same-that
is, the coefficient on Import-Intensive Industry was not significant, although the coefficient
on the treatment dummy was positive and significant.
110 See Bedzamik, Analysis of U.S. Industries Sensitive to Foreign Trade, 1982-1987, 116
MONTHLY LAB. REV. at 16 (defining as "export intensive" those industries with an average
export-penetration of 20 percent or more).
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Table 4. Analyses of import/export sensitivity and global exposure
Estimation window
Event window
Estimation price index

EST30
EV5

EST30
EV9

EST300
EV5

EST30
EV5

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

S&P
500

Manufacturing firms only (N = 287): import-intensive analysis
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with
8.89*
16.02*
1000 < HHI < 1800 (N= 33)
(3.28)
(5.84)
In import-intensive industry (N= 87)
-3.73
-6.87
(3.28)
(5.84)
Constant
-4.11*
-7.65*
(1.15)
(2.06)
Manufacturing firms only (N = 287): export intensive analysis
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with
9.28*
16.66*
1000 < HHI < 1800 (N= 33)
(3.22)
(5.73)
In export-intensive industry (N= 87)
-9.83*
-17.04*
(2.96)
(5.28)
Constant
-3.22*
-6.14*
(1.15)
(2.06)
All firms (N = 477): global exposure analysis
Nonutilities, subj. to CA in industries with
8.77*
17.30*
1000 < HHI < 1800 (N= 58)
(3.52)
(6.50)
In globally exposed industry (N = 197)
-1.21
-3.15
(2.35)
(4.31)
Constant
-3.74*
-7.22*
(1.57)
(2.89)

8.41*
(3.53)
-2.32
(3.53)
-4.88*
(1.24)

8.17*
(3.10)
-3.73
(3.10)
-8.99*
(1.09)

9.15*
(3.43)
-12.05*
(3.16)
-3.55*
(1.23)

8.71*
(3.01)
-11.56*
(2.77)
-7.87*
(1.08)

7.82*
(3.34)
0.67
(2.22)
-4.70*
(1.49)

6.80*
(2.60)
0.45
(1.72)
-9.34*
(1.15)

OLS regression, std. errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 4-digit SIC code level. CA, Clayton
Act.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
+Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

for all four parameter sets. Thus, although firms in export-intensive industries did see lower CARs than firms in import-intensive industries, there continues to be evidence of increased stock prices at firms most likely to benefit
from the 1982 Merger Guidelines.
Of course, although import and export intensity make sense as proxies for
exposure to world events for manufacturing facilities, they do not for many
other facilities in our study. Thus, we also use Grinold, Rudd and Stefek's
measure of global exposure of industries based on data from 1983 to 1988 to
determine whether more globally exposed firms were differentially affected by
the ceasefire. 11 In this context, global exposure measures the dependence of
security prices on global events relative to domestic events. 112 As was the case
"'

See Richard Grinold, Andrew Rudd, & Dan Stefek, Global Factors: Fact or Fiction, 16J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 79 (1989).

112 More specifically, Grinold, Rudd and Stefek identify industries as globally exposed if security
prices in the industry behave similarly across all countries. See id. Industries that react to
domestic events and thus have significant variation across countries are considered to be less
exposed. As was the case for import and export-intensity, we use a threshold value to create
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis for oil industry
Estimation window
Event window
Estimation price index

EST30
EV5

EST30
EV9

EST300
EV5

EST30
EV5

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

Wilshire
5000

S&P
500

Nonutilities, subj. to CA, 1000 < HHI <
1800 (N= 58)
In oil industry (N= 19)

7.43*
(3.58)
12.41*

14.77*
(6.58)
23.62*

6.33+
(3.39)
13.13*

5.58*
(2.62)
10.76*

Constant

(5.99)
-4.57*
(1.24)

(11.00)
-9.15*
(2.27)

(5.68)
-4.77*
(1.17)

(4.39)
-9.43*
(0.91)

OLS regression, std. errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 4-digit SIC code level. CA, Clayton
Act.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
+Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

for import and export sensitivity, the percentage of globally exposed firms did
not differ statistically between the Model 3 treatment and control groups
(58.6-61.7 percent, respectively). Also, as shown in Table 4, when a dummy
for global exposure was included in the regressions of cumulative abnormal
returns during the event window, the resulting coefficient was not statistically
significant, although the coefficient on the treatment dummy remained positive
and significant. Here again, there is no evidence that differences in global
exposure caused a differential response to the Falklands ceasefire or accounted
for the increased CAR for firms in the Model 3 treatment group.
Our review of economic events during this period also revealed that oil
prices and retail gasoline prices rose significantly between the end of the estimation period, April 30, 1982, and the event window in June of 1982.
Additionally, spot oil prices rose during the event window itself. Thus, as
shown in Table 5, we added a dummy variable, Oil, to the Model 3 regression. Of the 19 oil firms (that is, firms in either SIC 131 1-Crude Petroleum
and Natural Gas Extraction or SIC 291 1-Petroleum Refining) in our sample, all 19 are in the treatment group for Model 3. Thus, we do not include
an interaction between Oil and the treatment group. Note that for all parameter sets, the coefficient on Oil is positive and significant indicating that firms
involved in petroleum extraction and refining have a significantly higher
CAR than other firms. However, the positive and significant coefficients on
the treatment dummy remain for all four parameter sets, reconfirming our
finding that the announcement of the 1982 Merger Guidelines resulted in a
positive increase in firm value for firms with HHIs between 1,000 and 1,800
that were subject to Clayton Act regulation during this period.

a dummy variable indicating high global exposure. We define globally exposed industries to
be those where the "industry factor" is significant in determining security prices over 60% of
the time.

608

Journalof Competition Law & Economics

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Nonbinding guidelines are regularly issued by a number of executive agencies. This paper examines whether such guidelines can have a real effect on
market perceptions of agency policy. In particular, we study the impact of the
1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, which announced a substantial departure from the merger enforcement policy contained in the 1968
Guidelines they replaced. Although the 1982 Merger Guidelines articulated
a substantially less intrusive enforcement policy, the promulgation of nonbinding enforcement guidelines may not have resulted in a meaningful
change in actual enforcement policy. Indeed, some contend that change in
enforcement policy is necessarily gradual and that the Department's enforcement policy had already departed significantly from the 1968 Guidelines well
before the Department announced the 1982 Guidelines. Others, however,
assert that the new Guidelines signaled a substantial and abrupt change in
policy. Our analysis sought to determine empirically whether market actors
perceived the 1982 announcement as a harbinger of substantial change.
Using an event-study of the stock prices of S&P 500 firms, we find evidence of a significant positive effect on stock prices of a particular subset of
S&P 500 firms in the days surrounding the announcement of the 1982
Guidelines, namely, firms subject to the Clayton Act that are in moderately
concentrated industries (that is, have HHIs between 1000 and 1800). We
argue that this group of firms corresponds roughly to the group of firms for
which the new Guidelines announced a substantially more lenient enforcement policy. By contrast, the Guidelines do not appear to have effected any
real change in market perceptions of enforcement policy for firms in either
less concentrated or more concentrated industries. This is consistent with a
per-1982 merger policy that had evolved so as not to require challenges of
mergers in less concentrated markets (that is, with HHIs below 1,000).
Similarly, although the 1982 Guidelines were significantly less intrusive than
their 1968 predecessors, they do not appear to have convinced the market
that the prior enforcement regime's hostility to transactions in markets with
HHIs exceeding 1800 had changed.
These results are quite robust to a wide range of sensitivity analyses.
Adding other explanatory variables such as market valuation and indicators
for input and export sensitivity, global exposure, and oil firms do not alter
these findings. The results are also robust to different estimate and event
windows and different predictors of market returns. Finally, when we examine other event windows both for arguably relevant dates and for random
dates, we do not find a similar effect. Thus, we believe that these findings
clearly point to the 1982 Merger Guidelines as signaling a credible change in
U.S. merger enforcement policy.

